CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND SIXTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 3 February 1994, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Gérard Errera (France)

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The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 669th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

I intend first of all to give the floor to the speakers on the list for today, then to proceed to the appointment of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, and lastly to turn to the requests for participation in our work from States that are not members of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Romania, Japan and the United States of America. I therefore now give the floor to the representative of Romania, Ambassador Neagu.

Mr. NEAGU (Romania) (translated from French): The first month in the work of the Conference on Disarmament is always the most stimulating and the most difficult period of the year. Allow me, Mr. President, to express to you first of all our satisfaction at seeing you in the Chair during this month which is going to require difficult efforts of concentration with a view to organizing our work. We are convinced that you, representing a country with which Romania has always maintained excellent relations, will be able, thanks to your tact and great experience, to guarantee the success of this first phase. You may count on the unreserved support of my delegation. Allow me also to express our gratitude to Ambassador Mounir Zahran of Egypt who served as President in an exemplary manner for the month of August and coordinated our consultations during the inter-sessional period. We extend our greetings to our new Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, and our new Deputy Secretary-General, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail. I would like to take this opportunity to extend a cordial welcome to the new colleagues who have taken up their duties as representatives to the Conference - Ambassador Yousuf Omar of Ethiopia, Ambassador Juan Carlos Sánchez Arnau of Argentina, Ambassador Alfredo Tarre Murzi of Venezuela and Ambassador Alessandro Vattani of Italy.

(continued in English)

The past four years have witnessed profound changes in the political order that was put in place after World War II. The international community today is at an historic juncture of momentous change. With the disintegration of the bipolar structure, the end of the cold war and the confrontation between the two military blocs, the world was given the possibility for the first time in the nuclear era to successfully tackle the problems of reducing the arms race with the aim of eliminating the spectre of nuclear annihilation, cutting down military forces and conventional armaments, promoting transparency in armaments and military activities and various other important confidence-building measures.

The international situation remains yet complex and fluid, as zones of instability, conflict and tension seem to proliferate. The Yugoslav tragedy brought back the flames of war on the European continent for the first time in more than 40 years. Other conflicts in the former Soviet Union as well as in

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other parts of the world are no less preoccupying. Therefore a renewed effort should now be devoted to the implementation of a global agenda of arms control and disarmament for the post-cold war era, regionally or globally. New rules, norms and standards to enhance a sustainable international security order have to be fixed.

The world no longer faces the need to stabilize a relation of nuclear confrontation, while stability has become a more complex objective as it has to be pursued in a variety of specific contexts. These negative evolutions undermine the efforts aimed at arms control and disarmament. It proves that indeed disarmament is closely linked with international security and in order to be successful it has to be integrated with international security. The United Nations revival in accordance with its natural vocation, as defined by the Charter, the increasing role of the General Assembly and especially of the Security Council, the strengthening of CSCE and other regional structures, appear to confirm the growing ascendancy of the political over the military factor.

In this framework it is worth mentioning the interest expressed by Central and Eastern European countries, including Romania, to be admitted to NATO and the recent "Partnership for Peace" plan, which is seen as a preliminary stage finally leading to the quality of a full member of the Alliance. It is well known that from the very beginning Romania expressed its firm wish to become a NATO member, assuming all responsibilities derived from that membership. This wish was renewed on the eve of the last NATO summit meeting by the letter Romania's President addressed to the Alliance Secretary-General as well as to the heads of State and government of the member States. Thus by the new "Partnership for Peace", which Romania was the first to join officially only a week ago, NATO would make an important step towards its enlargement. "Partnership for Peace" will mark a new stage in Romania's integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.

The basic changes in strategic perceptions and the removal of former threats are being codified in new agreements that contribute to a more peaceful world at lower levels of armaments. We should indeed derive encouragement from recent developments and achievements in the field of disarmament and arms control. The START agreements for the elimination of strategic arms bear witness that the nuclear threat has receded dramatically. The START II agreement, which will reduce by two thirds the current levels of strategic offensive nuclear weapons in the United States and Russia, will enhance security and stability - both military and politically - on the international scene and will give impetus to bilateral, regional and multilateral efforts aimed at eliminating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction around the world. Romania welcomes the recent conclusion by the United States, the Russian Federation and Ukraine of a nuclear agreement aimed at removing an important number of intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads. This is indeed a real breakthrough that will enhance the security of the entire world. Now we are waiting for rapid process towards the full implementation of the START commitments.

The conclusion of the chemical weapons Convention has proved the indispensable role of multilateral disarmament endeavours in the post-cold-war

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period and has been considered a tremendous success for the negotiating effort of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. The CWC is a milestone in the process of disarmament, since it provides for the total elimination of a whole category of weapons of mass destruction. It is the belief of my delegation that the chemical weapons Convention remains a standard instrument that could be a model for the elaboration of other disarmament agreements which the CD will be charged with.

The notable progress that has been achieved in the work of the Preparatory Commission so far in The Hague will definitely advance the process for most States signatories to ratify the Convention at an early date. Romania intends to conclude the ratification process before the end of this year. Meanwhile we shall spare no effort toward making the Convention universal and shall join all common endeavours to this end.

The last two years have registered favourable results for improving and strengthening the regime under another important international instrument - the 1972 biological weapons Convention. This latter agreement, aimed at excluding completely the possibility of biological agents and toxins being used as weapons, represented a real turning-point in the modern age, for it was the first international document since World War II to provide for the actual elimination of an abhorrent weapon from the arsenals of nations. So far, out of the three international treaties covering weapons of mass destruction in the nuclear, biological and chemical fields, the BWC is the only one deprived of policing mechanisms or verification measures. Therefore Romania, while working toward universal adherence to the Convention, supported the decision taken by the third BWC review conference in 1991 to establish an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint. Romanian experts took an active part in the work of VEREX, which was successfully accomplished last September by the adoption of a consensus report. In accordance with its main conclusion, some of the potential verification measures would contribute to strengthening the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention. Against this background, last autumn Romania joined those countries asking officially for the convening of a special conference of the States parties to the Convention that would take a decision on further steps to strengthen its verification machinery and thus close another loophole in the broader regime for weapons of mass destruction.

Significant progress has been achieved in the area of conventional disarmament. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe established a new military balance at a substantially lower level of armaments. My Government welcomes the successful completion of the first reduction phase of the CFE Treaty, whose full implementation and integrity remain fundamental to European stability and security. At the same time, confidence-building measures have proved pace-setters for disarmament measures, as stipulated in the 1990 Vienna Document which put in place and into operation in Europe a comprehensive system of confidence- and security-building measures. These measures contribute to transparency, predictability and crisis management and may constitute an example to be followed for enhancing security and cooperation in other regions. In line with this and as a transparency

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measure, the 1992 "open skies" Treaty, which provides for short-notice surveillance flights by aircraft over an area from Vancouver east to Pavlovskoe (the former Vladivostok), contributes to regional stability by allowing countries the opportunity to monitor their neighbours, thus reducing concerns.

With respect to the future agenda of disarmament and arms control, my Government shares the view that the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of conventional weapons should constitute a paramount concern of the international community in the years to come. Future multilateral arms control agreements, export controls exercised by supplier groups, regimes and other institutions such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) should play major roles in the many efforts which will be required in order to reduce, cut, control and cope with the consequences of the increase in weaponry: the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological and advanced conventional weapons and delivery systems such as ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and modern aircraft. My delegation will join other interested delegations in the promotion of new measures and initiatives to better control and constrain proliferation and, in general, to refine non-proliferation strategy.

We share widely expressed views concerning weapons of mass destruction, efforts to prevent proliferation of these weapons and their delivery vehicles, arms transfers, transparency in armaments and other confidence-building measures. In our opinion, treaties on weapons of mass impact and export control regimes are complementary, interlocking parts of international security. Export control regimes are meant to make it easier for any recipient State to acquire whatever technology it needs for its peaceful development. States that strictly abide by non-proliferation regimes should have no reason to complain about such regimes. That is why Romania actively participates in a number of groups and regimes aimed at developing responsible proliferation control, not only of nuclear, biological and chemical arms, but also of long-range delivery systems and dual-use technologies. My country is considering joining those multilateral arrangements of which is not yet a full member such as, for instance, MTCR and the Australia Group. In fact, my Government has already publicly committed itself to comply with the guidelines and the spirit of such international groupings and regimes and has developed national legislation accordingly.

The global non-proliferation regime has many facets, but its heart and fundamental pillar remains the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), supported by the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system and national export controls. The NPT and its verification machinery effectively bar the dissemination of nuclear weapons and provide an indispensable instrument for international peace and security.

The NPT, which has now 160 States parties, including all permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, is the most widely supported arms control treaty there has ever been. Yet the NPT has not fulfilled all the hopes of its creators. There are continuing challenges to this Treaty which, if ignored, could undermine its credibility and effectiveness. Important absentees, compliance problems and worrying proliferation pressures

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in different regions of the world are sources of weakness as well. Without underestimating these problems, we have however to acknowledge that the large mass of parties are fulfilling their obligations in good faith and that it was the NPT which created the political framework for all arms control achievements of the last quarter of the century. Therefore, my Government reaffirms its confidence in this Treaty, which is, indeed, the cornerstone of the world's non-proliferation regime.

Next year the NPT parties will decide by a majority vote "whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods". It is said that prospects for an indefinite extension depend upon arguments that the NPT is meeting its goals. There is no need to argue that two of the main goals - to foster the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to encourage nuclear arms control and disarmament - are being met. It is the view of my delegation that the third main goal - to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons - has also registered positive, encouraging results. In this regard, we consider it a measure of the NPT's success, inter alia, that at present we have the same number of nuclear-weapon States as 25 years ago and that in recent years we have witnessed important changes in the nuclear balance due to the INF and START treaties.

The NPT establishes a norm, a standard of international behaviour backed up by a legal process. This leads States to renounce the right to acquire nuclear weapons. Nobody can deny that the existence of the NPT has been essential to the efforts to bind three non-Russian republics of the former USSR to adherence to non-nuclear-weapon status. These are a clear benefit of keeping the NPT in force indefinitely.

In our opinion, the preparatory process for the 1995 review and extension conference for the non-proliferation Treaty should be an opportunity for States parties to redouble their efforts in attaining the objective of non-proliferation and strengthening the NPT. The second in a series of four preparatory committees for this Conference concluded in New York two weeks ago, discussing matters of procedure, organization and substance. The first two Prepcom meetings thus paved the way for a thorough review of the way this international instrument operates and for a well-founded decision on the duration of its extension. Romania firmly believes that the non-proliferation Treaty should continue to be in existence indefinitely and unconditionally after 1995.

With the ending of the cold war and with the declared nuclear Powers having no major Power as an "enemy" that must be deterred from a nuclear attack, there is now an opportunity to end the nuclear arms race and to move rapidly toward the reduction and the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. That is, of course, the surest and best way to end the danger of nuclear proliferation and to rid the world of the nuclear threat.

The need to achieve a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT) has become a crucial issue connected with the NPT and with nuclear disarmament in general. To date, with the positive change in the international political climate, fresh momentum is gathering for renewed efforts towards the realization of this goal, a process in which Romania is ready to play a full

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and constructive part. The conclusion of a CTBT will certainly strengthen the existing non-proliferation regime and would undoubtedly increase the chances of success at the NPT review conference. In addition, it will dispel all the concerns about environmental damage by nuclear pollution. A universally applicable and internationally verifiable test ban would strengthen international security, contribute to ongoing efforts to prevent States from developing a nuclear-weapon programme and represent a further step towards nuclear disarmament.

My delegation shares the view that the ban should be effectively verifiable by means of both seismic and non-seismic technologies. The core of the future international verification system could be the seismic data exchange network, on which extensive work has been accomplished by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events (GSE). As an active participant in the GSE, Romania fully supports the tremendous efforts made by the Group and its contributing scientific experts to establish a solid verification architecture to serve the needs of a CTB treaty.

Now, due to the substantial and painstaking efforts deployed in the inter-sessional period by Ambassador Yoshitomo Tanaka of Japan and lately by you, Mr. President, and thanks to the understanding and the spirit of compromise and cooperation of all delegations, we have the necessary means to proceed smoothly to effective negotiations, i.e. an Ad Hoc Committee with a clear negotiating mandate and a Chairman. My delegation expresses its full confidence in the diplomatic talent and ability, in the experience and professional skills of Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico - the freshly elected Chairman of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee - and pledges its full support to all endeavours in order to achieve concrete results in drafting a treaty prohibiting all nuclear explosions in all environments.

Turning to another important issue, namely effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (NSA), my delegation deems that progress on this crucial area of regional and global peace and security will facilitate further strengthening of the non-proliferation regime, and that full-scope nuclear security guarantees in favour of the non-nuclear-weapon States would pave the way for the success of the review and extension of the non-proliferation Treaty at the 1995 conference. Such an arrangement should essentially be premised upon a universal and legally binding international agreement providing for negative as well as positive security assurances that are global in scope, uniform and comprehensive and ensure the equality of all States renouncing the acquisition of nuclear weapons through multilateral treaties. At the same time, a search for a solution to the problem of security assurances should not leave aside the United Nations, which has considerably enhanced its role and credibility in maintaining international peace and security. Therefore we favour the idea of a Security Council confirmation - on a broader basis - of the commitments which were originally undertaken by three nuclear-weapon States in Security Council resolution 255 (1968).

The formal debates and informal consultations which took place last year in the NSA Ad Hoc Committee - which I had the honour to chair - demonstrated

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the readiness of the delegations to continue the search for a common approach on the substance of negative security assurances. It is the view of my delegation that the time is now ripe for us to address this issue of utmost importance in a concrete manner and to lay down on paper appropriate provisions of future agreements. I am confident that the new Chairman of the NSA Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Wolfgang Hoffmann of Germany, whose ability and professional capacity have been proven again during his chairmanship of the OS Ad Hoc Committee, will succeed in laying down the basis of a good start towards fulfilling the negotiating mandate of this subsidiary body.

Another most welcome step towards the goal of stemming nuclear proliferation would be to seek an international halt to the production of weapons-grade fissionable materials. The existing amounts of plutonium and highly enriched uranium have been for years in abundant supply for the declining number of nuclear weapons. It seems quite possible now to codify the cessation of such production in a legally binding instrument which could reassure the world community - by including appropriate verification machinery - that fissionable materials are not being covertly produced or procured. I wish every success to Ambassador Gerald Shannon of Canada, who was elected as special coordinator for open-ended consultations on a fissile materials cut-off, in his difficult task of clarifying the appropriate measures and steps to be taken in this field.

The distressing events and armed conflicts occurring in various parts of the world, notably Eastern Europe, clearly prove the consequences of unbridled and excessive accumulation of conventional weapons. That is why Romania attaches just as much importance to the control of increasingly dangerous conventional arms as to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass impact. Against this background, the area of "transparency in armaments" is indeed challenging. It touches upon issues relating to excessive and destabilizing accumulations of arms on which international efforts are urgently called for in various parts of the world. As the President of Romania, His Excellency Mr. Ion Iliescu, stated last June before the plenary of the Conference on Disarmament, the overall aspects regarding "transparency in armaments" could be regulated through an international treaty of universal vocation, which would set standards and procedures, as well as appropriate implementation mechanisms. Agreed "guidelines" to serve as an "international code of conduct" could be a first step to this end.

The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms is an important component of "transparency in armaments". Some 82 States, including Romania, have by now submitted data on their imports and exports of conventional weapons. This is a promising start, although broader participation remains essential. In our opinion, the Register could establish an international code of conduct for the purposes of controlling arms transfers and the activities of weapons suppliers in accordance with universally applicable rules and standards. Romania will maintain its efforts to carry this important confidence-building initiative further. I warmly congratulate Ambassador György Boytha of Hungary on his election as Chairman of the TIA Ad Hoc Committee. I am sure that under his able guidance this Committee will register further notable progress.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Romania for his statement and the kind words he addressed to me and to my country, which I very much appreciated. I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Ambassador Tanaka.

Mr. TANAKA (Japan): I have taken the floor today to express, at the initial stage of this year's session of the Conference on Disarmament, the principal views of the delegation of Japan on the issues before us.

Following the successful conclusion of the negotiation of the chemical weapons convention, the Conference seemed to undergo a transitional period last year, searching for its new priority tasks to be addressed. At the time when the raison d'être of the Conference was questioned as we saw dramatic changes in the international security environment surrounding arms control and disarmament, the Conference succeeded in smoothly starting its work by adopting pragmatic methods without wasting too much time on procedural debates as had often been the case before.

A breakthrough was achieved on the issue of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban last year, which had long been regarded as an issue of the highest priority of the Conference. In the favourable political circumstances created by the declared or de facto testing moratorium of the nuclear-weapon States, a historic decision was taken on 10 August to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Building on this decision, a draft specific mandate for the negotiations was agreed to, during the course of the inter-sessional consultations, and was formally adopted at the beginning of this year's session of the Conference on 25 January, Mr. President, under your presidency. The mandate, I believe, has laid an appropriate ground for the forthcoming substantive negotiations on this important issue. Also at the last plenary on Tuesday, we could agree on a Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. I, having had the privilege to chair the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban last year, am very pleased by these developments and would like to take this opportunity to thank all my colleagues here for their cooperation extended to me. I also would like to congratulate Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico on having been elected Chairman of the Committee this year to lead the important negotiations, and express our hope that the Committee will make important progress under his chairmanship.

Japan has long attached the greatest importance to the issue of a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests. Another landmark last year was the consensus adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of the CTB resolution urging the Conference to proceed intensively, as a priority task, in its negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. My delegation has a definite objective for the 1994 session of the Conference, and I believe that this objective is shared by all delegations which have assembled here. Namely, we will make every possible effort to contribute to rapid progress in the negotiations on a CTBT. In so doing, my delegation urges at the same time all nuclear-weapon States to continue to refrain from testing to maintain the present political climate favourable to the CTBT negotiations.

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

It is, of course, a matter for the Ad Hoc Committee itself to work out in detail how the negotiations are to be initiated. At this stage I confine myself to stating that it is the hope of Japan that we will discuss the basic elements of the treaty and identify the key issues to be addressed in an efficient manner, so that we may be able to start the drafting of a CTB treaty text as soon as possible. It is not appropriate to set artificial deadlines for the entire negotiation of the treaty, since if we rush we may end up with an incomplete and inappropriate content of the treaty. Nevertheless it is essential to proceed to the drafting work at the earliest possible date.

Having said this, I would like to introduce our preliminary views on some of the basic elements of the treaty. As to the scope of a CTBT, Japan is of the view that any nuclear-weapon test explosion should be prohibited, including those which are called "peaceful nuclear explosions".

The question of verification is the most difficult but important issue in the negotiation of a CTBT. We understand from the discussions we have had so far that there is general agreement that the seismic network which has been elaborated over many years by the Group of Seismic Experts (GSE) can provide an effective means of verification. We should be reminded, however, that the next technical test by the GSE to be conducted with a view to establishing the network (GSETT-3) will only begin in January 1995 and that in the meantime a number of points remain to be clarified, including such points as, for instance, how much it would cost to set up the network and how such a network would be operated. Therefore, it is essential to find solutions to these questions as soon as possible in order to reach an early conclusion of the negotiation of a CTBT. From this standpoint, Japan decided to host a workshop on CTB verification in the middle of March this year, to consider the problems of CTB verification mainly based on seismological methods, for the purpose of contributing to the promotion of the CTBT negotiations.

As to the verification system itself, we should aim to elaborate an effective verification regime, based on the combination of a monitoring system, of which the seismic monitoring network will be the key component, and on-site inspection. At the same time, due consideration should be given to the achievement of cost-effectiveness of a verification regime by making extensive use of national technical means of States parties to the treaty. Furthermore, such a verification regime needs to be flexible to adapt itself to the advance of technologies, and to improve the capability of detecting smaller and covert nuclear explosions.

With regard to on-site inspection, the points to be addressed are such matters as when it is needed, how it is conducted and what is the range and content of activities. For the elaboration of these points, our experience in the negotiation of the chemical weapons Convention may serve as good guidance.

On the questions of adherence and entry into force, while it is essential to ensure the widest possible adherence, it may not be advisable to provide unnecessarily heavy conditions on the entry into force of the treaty.

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

My delegation welcomes the fact that Ambassador Shannon of Canada was appointed as special coordinator on the issue of the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices ("cut-off"). My delegation hopes that forthcoming consultations under Ambassador Shannon on this new subject entrusted to the Conference will lay the foundation for the negotiations in the near future. The question of a "cut-off" is directly related to nuclear non-proliferation and in that sense it is the one which should go hand in hand with a CTBT. Therefore, Japan thinks it appropriate that a "cut-off" convention should be negotiated here in the Conference on Disarmament while appreciating that detailed technical elaboration on verification and safeguards may be entrusted to IAEA.

Now I would like to briefly address some other issues before us. Before doing so, I should like to extend our congratulations to Ambassador Norberg of Sweden for his assumption of the role of Special Coordinator on the agenda of the CD. On the question of negative security assurances (NSA), various views were expressed last year, but regrettably no tangible outcome emerged in terms of negotiating a treaty text. I hope that some substantive progress will be achieved this year at the re-established Ad Hoc Committee on NSA under the chairmanship of Ambassador Hoffmann of Germany.

As to transparency in armaments (TIA), last year the Conference established, for the first time in its history, an Ad Hoc Committee on TIA where a number of concrete proposals were put forward and intensive discussions were carried out. My delegation was encouraged by these developments. As for the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, more than 80 countries participated in its first year, which is, in our view, worth appreciation as a good start. This year, there will be three meetings of the governmental experts to discuss further development of the Register. Japan looks forward to a successful outcome of the meetings. Also here in the Conference on Disarmament, we should continue our deliberations on TIA as an important issue which requires sustained efforts. We congratulate Ambassador Boytha of Hungary on his assumption of the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on TIA. We hope that more constructive deliberations than last year will be made, in particular on the question of military holdings and procurement through national production.

On the pending issue of the expansion of the CD membership, it is the hope of my delegation that this issue will be solved as early as possible and that the eventual expansion will contribute to the activities of the Conference.

The non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been playing a pivotal role in maintaining and strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime: the subject which should be addressed with the highest priority now by the international community. Next year will be the critical year in that the future of the NPT will be decided upon. I believe that the negotiations and deliberations in the field of nuclear disarmament to be held this year in the Conference, especially on a CTBT, "cut-off" and NSA, are decisively important in building a favourable political environment which will have an impact on the success of the NPT review and extension conference to be held next year.

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

We believe that the Conference has sufficient potential to deal successfully with these issues. Maximum use should be made of this potential to realize the hopes of the international community for greater stability and security.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America) (translated from French): Mr. President, allow me to offer my congratulations to you as well as best wishes for success in guiding the Conference at the start of the 1994 session. You have my full support and that of my delegation in this difficult task.

(continued in English)

I would also like to express thanks to Ambassador Zahran of Egypt for his skilful guidance and persistent hard work as the CD President during the long inter-sessional period which ended last week. And I welcome CD Secretary-General Petrovsky and Deputy Secretary-General Bensmail as well as our new colleagues who have joined the CD since last year's closing plenary.

The importance the United States attaches to the 1994 session of the CD, as we begin negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, was symbolized by the message from the President of the United States presented to the first plenary meeting of the Conference by John D. Holum, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. In that message, President Clinton reiterated the United States commitment to a comprehensive and verifiable ban on all nuclear explosions at the earliest possible time. This commitment has been put into action in a number of ways: by the United States moratorium on testing, by the United States appeal to all other nuclear-weapons States to show the same restraint; by United States support of the historic CD decision last August to negotiate a test-ban treaty; and by United States support and co-sponsorship of the consensus United Nations General Assembly resolution on a CTBT.

United States support for a CTBT is based upon fundamental concerns about international peace and security. Others share these concerns; many States represented here have spoken of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of nuclear weapons in particular. More than 30 years ago, the signatories of the partial test-ban Treaty established the goal of achieving "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time," a goal that was reaffirmed by the non-proliferation Treaty. With the end of the cold war much of the hostility and misunderstanding that created the threat of nuclear annihilation disappeared. However, the proliferation of nuclear weapons now poses another threat to international security. This threat makes essential the unlimited extension of the NPT, and gives added meaning to the CTBT as a means to retard and even prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

A major United States aim is to ensure that the treaty achieves the broadest possible participation, since it is only through the widest participation that a CTBT can fully meet our overall non-proliferation objectives. A second major goal is to seek cost-effective, robust monitoring and verification measures in the treaty to guard against those who might seek to violate its provisions.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

The CD embarks on CTBT negotiations with a wealth of multilateral negotiating experience. The partial test-ban Treaty and the chemical weapons Convention are useful models and tools for use in the work before us. A prime issue as we begin negotiations is the overall structure of the treaty, which could follow the CWC model. This appears to be the approach followed in Australia's proposed outline (CD/1235 and Corr.1), or "table of contents" for a treaty. We look forward to commenting on treaty structure in the NTB Ad Hoc Committee and hope the Committee can reach quick agreement on structure which will serve as a guide for its work.

On general treaty obligations, or the scope of the treaty, the United States believes that the treaty should constitute a comprehensive ban. It should not be a threshold treaty; rather, it should focus on nuclear-weapons explosions and rule out all nuclear explosions any time anywhere. Moreover, the United States has long believed that any nuclear explosion could provide military benefits. Therefore, there should be no exceptions for so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. Such a comprehensive prohibition can be achieved by employing language similar to that of article 1 of the partial test-ban Treaty, which concerns "any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion," a formulation similar to that contained in the NPT. This is the approach reflected in the Swedish draft treaty text (CD/1232), and we endorse such an approach which provides an appropriately broad definition of what we want to achieve.

The United States does not yet have a fixed view on entry into force (or EIF), but we do have some general ideas. To achieve non-proliferation goals, the CTBT must gain wide - even universal - adherence. It is also essential that all nuclear-weapon States be party to the treaty at EIF. The United States would favour an approach designed to garner early adherence by a significant number of key States, but we would have some doubt about making EIF contingent on ratification by a specific group of States, beyond the nuclear-weapons States. Hence we believe that the considerations that led to the rather conservative entry-into-force provisions of the CWC should not apply to the CTBT.

Conversely, we believe the CWC could well serve as a model for development of a CTBT sanctions regime. We naturally hope that effective CTBT verification provisions will have a deterrent effect on would-be violators. Nevertheless, the CTBT should provide for rigorous, non-discriminatory collective action against violators and for ultimate recourse to the United Nations Security Council.

The international verification regime will be the central element in this treaty. We believe that such a regime must ensure high confidence among the parties to the CTBT that there is compliance with the provisions of the treaty, without creating an unnecessary burden for participants. At the same time, any verification regime must be constrained by the limits of monitoring technology and the costs of operating a regime.

In our view, an effective CTBT verification regime should have an efficient monitoring capability consisting of multiple components, e.g., a seismic network, atmospheric sampling for radionuclides and gaseous debris,

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

and provisions for on-site inspections. This system should be capable of identifying and attributing with high confidence evasively conducted nuclear explosions of less than a few kilotons' yield in broad areas of the globe.

Responsibility for effective verification will have to be shared among the parties individually and also in the context of an international structure for treaty implementation. The costs of establishing, operating, and maintaining monitoring networks will have to be shared equitably. We will need carefully to assess monitoring resources already available internationally, and to identify those that can help form the basis for an international system.

Clearly an international organization will be required to manage the exchange of relevant monitoring data, to provide a forum for rapid review of requests for on-site inspection, to administer the conduct of an approved on-site inspection and to provide a forum for the discussion and collective assessment of treaty compliance questions presented by the parties to the treaty. We believe that such an organization can be kept within acceptable managerial and cost-effective parameters. Some delegations have proposed that IAEA undertake these responsibilities, but the United States has reservations about this approach.

Caution should be applied in regard to how far the CTBT verification net should be cast. We have not been able to identify any pre-test activities unique to a covert nuclear-weapons programme that could reasonably be monitored under a CTBT, without considerable technical and political difficulty and enormous increase in cost. We have strong doubts regarding pre-test verification and believe this field should be reserved for NPT-related activities.

My statement includes preliminary comments on some of the main issues that we will be working on collectively in the months ahead. I look forward to presenting more views on verification and other elements of a CTBT as thinking in Washington progresses further. As a nuclear-weapons State, my country feels a special responsibility to make a meaningful contribution to these CTB negotiations. We intend to carry out that responsibility with our stated CTBT goals and the necessary maintenance of our security in mind.

Now that the Conference has re-established the NTB Ad Hoc Committee with a mandate to negotiate a CTBT, and has approved, as Committee Chairman, the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico, the way is clear to begin negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. I can assure you that the United States delegation is ready to go to work.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement.

(continued in English)

I am particularly grateful to him for the very kind words he addressed to me, and for his good wishes. I congratulate him on his mastery of the French language.

(The President)

(continued in French)

We have now reached the end of the list of speakers for today. Does any other representative wish to take the floor at this stage? None does.

At our last plenary meeting, we appointed the chairmen of three ad hoc committees and two special coordinators. The appointment of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space was left pending. I am happy to be able to propose the candidature of Ambassador Pérez Novoa of Cuba for this post. May I take it that the Conference decides to accept this proposal?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I would like to convey my warm congratulations to Ambassador Pérez Novoa and wish him every success in his task. I would ask the Cuban delegation to pass on these congratulations to Ambassador Pérez Novoa.

With the appointment of Ambassador Pérez Novoa to the post of Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Space, the Conference is now in a position to begin its substantive work. I would like to take this opportunity to renew my thanks to all the delegations for the flexibility and spirit of compromise which have enabled us to arrive at this result.

I now turn to consideration of the new requests for participation in our work from the following non-member States: Madagascar and Spain. The secretariat has circulated a note from the President today (CD/WP.452) containing these requests. No objections were raised to these requests during the consultations I carried out. Accordingly, I suggest that we adopt the recommendation contained in document CD/WP.452 directly in plenary, on the understanding that this will not constitute a precedent for future occasions on which an informal meeting may be necessary. May I take it that the Conference so decides?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): We have now reached the end of our agenda for today. Does any delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? If not, I intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. Before doing so I wish to remind delegations that the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban will be holding its first meeting this afternoon at 3.30 p.m. in this room. I would also like to invite the chairmen of the ad hoc committees and the special coordinators who have been appointed to a meeting immediately after this plenary meeting in room I for the purpose of finalizing the timetable of future meetings.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 10 February 1994 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.20 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.670
10 February 1994

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND SEVENTIETH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 10 February 1994, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Gérard Errera (France)

GE.94-60284 (E)

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 670th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

First of all, I wish on behalf of the Conference and in my personal capacity to extend a welcome to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, His Excellency Mr. Stanislav Daskalov, who will be the first speaker at this plenary meeting. The visit he is paying us today testifies to the interest attached by his Government to the work of the Conference. I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Bulgaria, Ukraine, Indonesia, Hungary, Chile, Myanmar, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Mongolia. I now call on the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, His Excellency Mr. Stanislav Daskalov.

Mr. DASKALOV (Bulgaria): Mr. President, first let me congratulate you on the occasion of your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. We are confident that due to your diplomatic skills and well-known capacity to reach consensus you will contribute to the effective work of the Conference on Disarmament. I would like also to extend my greetings to the new Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, whose eminent competence in the field of disarmament and experience in multilateral diplomacy will certainly be an asset to the Conference. We warmly welcome the new Deputy Secretary-General Abdelkader Bensmail and wish him every success. I would like to thank you for your kind words addressed to me, which I take as a new expression of the traditionally friendly relations between France and Bulgaria.

This is my first opportunity to address the Conference on Disarmament as Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria and I would like to express the positions of my country on a number of issues of interest to the single multilateral body for negotiations on disarmament.

Bulgaria is firmly committed to a consistent stabilizing policy in the Balkans. At the same time our country faces the challenge of the problems of global security, arms control and disarmament. In this connection, we attach great importance to the active participation of our delegation in the Conference on Disarmament. Our intention is to demonstrate sound political will and to mobilize the expertise potential needed to achieve concrete results in these multilateral negotiations.

Our approach to the global problems of disarmament and international security was outlined at the forty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly. My country supported the earliest possible conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, the fissile material production ban, as well as the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the NPT's extension. In the field of conventional arms control we supported greater transparency through the United Nations Register, which had a successful start last year. Our country was one of the 82 States that submitted the data required for the Register. We are in favour of the strict regulation of the arms trade and prevention of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms. Bulgaria will take part in the work of the group of governmental

(Mr. Daskalov, Bulgaria)

experts who are to prepare a review conference on the Convention on weapons that may be deemed to be excessively injurious or have indiscriminate effects.

Bulgaria welcomes the Partnership for Peace programme adopted by the heads of State and government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, addressed to the East European States, and considers it as a step towards the integration of these countries into NATO. It is our belief that this is in the interest of strengthening and guaranteeing international security. Bulgaria has already taken the necessary preparatory actions for the implementation of the Programme. The framework document for future cooperation is to be signed by the President of the Republic of Bulgaria, Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev, next week in Brussels. Bulgaria shares the view that the integration trend should dominate the European security architecture, taking into consideration the complex situation in south-east Europe. The opportunity to consult with NATO in the case of direct threats to our territorial integrity, political independence or security, as well as those of any other Central or East European country, we consider as a very useful form of political cooperation in the framework of the Partnership for Peace initiative. Bulgaria is in favour of deepening practical cooperation both with NATO and its member States on the one hand, and with North Atlantic Council participants and, on the other hand, with Russia.

Though Bulgaria has no reason to consider itself threatened by other countries, we undertook joint measures in the past two or three years with the neighbouring States aimed at reaching agreements on security, cooperation and confidence-building measures. The specific situation on the Balkans requires new approaches towards regional security matters, with the participation of the European and Euro-Atlantic military and political structures. These approaches should take into consideration the interests of the Balkan States and the main political Powers - the European Union, Russia, the United States, as well as all other countries willing to achieve peace and prosperity in this part of the world.

I should like to express the position of my country, in concrete terms, on some major items on this year's agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. Following the breakthrough achieved last year with the conclusion of a chemical weapons Convention, the next great chance for this multilateral forum would be to reach a treaty on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. Particularly encouraging is the positive development in the positions of some nuclear countries. Considerable results have also been reached by the Group of Scientific Experts dealing with the development of verification procedures for a future treaty. What remains to be done are final serious efforts aimed at reaching a universal nuclear-test-ban treaty, unlimited in its duration and subject to international and effective control. For that purpose the Conference is to concentrate on as many existing resources as possible. Along with the resumption of the Ad Hoc Committee's work, working groups on verification, legal and institutional questions could be set up. According to its capability Bulgaria will contribute to the successful accomplishment of these negotiations. As far as we are concerned we are also thinking over the possibility, under favourable international circumstances, to participate in a future organization on verification of the implementation

(Mr. Daskalov, Bulgaria)

of the nuclear-test-ban treaty. It is known that for years now Bulgaria has been taking part in the voluntary exchange of seismic data and has at its disposal expertise and equipment.

The end of the cold war and the enhanced attention of a number of countries to the nuclear non-proliferation regime increase the potential for finding a unified approach to security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States. We welcome the agreement between the United States of America and the Russian Federation to consider jointly appropriate ways of strengthening security assurances for all the States that renounced the possession of nuclear weapons and strictly abide by their obligation in that regard. We can assure you that Bulgaria will be active in the discussions on this particular matter at the present CD session.

Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction became an important norm in international law, called upon to ensure greater security on a global scale. Bulgaria believes that every possible effort should be made to bring to a successful end the 1995 NPT extension conference. We sincerely believe that the international community will manage to strike a balance in the approaches, which would permit to preserve for an unlimited period of time the huge potential of the non-proliferation Treaty in the interest of peace and stability. The success of efforts aimed at banning nuclear tests and strengthening security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT could contribute to achieving that major objective. Bulgaria strictly abides by its obligations as a party to the existing export control regimes. My country is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zanger Committee. The guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group are an indispensable part of existing national legislation on export control policy. This, we believe, strengthens the main objectives of the non-proliferation regime.

Bulgaria's interest in progress on the question of transparency in armaments and the exchange of information, on an unofficial basis, is understandable having in mind the situation in the Balkans. My country proceeds from considerations of principle and calls for measures aimed at increasing transparency both on a regional and on a global scale. The universal participation in the United Nations Register of Conventional Weapons, which should take into account also the acquisition of such weapons - including international arms transfers, military holdings and procurement through national production - is just a first step. The Conference on Disarmament would fulfil its function if it manages to give its share also to solve the problem of limiting conventional weapons production and their transfers. In this respect the Conference on Disarmament should have clear ideas on the results from the first year's functioning of the United Nations Register and its contribution to the extension of transparency in armaments, the strengthening of confidence and early warning mechanisms.

On the question of prevention of an arms race in outer space, Bulgaria holds the view that the adoption of an updated mandate of the respective Ad Hoc Committee, based on the significance of confidence-building measures in outer space, is a realistic task for this session. As a form of information

(Mr. Daskalov, Bulgaria)

exchange I should like to state that my country is in process of completing the elaboration of is national jurisdiction, envisaged in the chemical weapons Convention, with regard to its application. For the sake of Bulgaria's security, and that of the Balkans, it is important that all Balkan countries participate in the Convention and it would even be preferable if they ratify it at the same time.

In conclusion, I would permit myself to encourage the work of the Conference on Disarmament on those delicate aspects relative to the extension of its membership, agenda and the increase of its effectiveness. The Conference on Disarmament is to become, as soon as possible, a widely represented but rationally functioning forum for the elaboration of treaties, whose effect could play a key role in strengthening international security. We consider the nomination of a Special Coordinator on the prohibition of production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices as a first step to a process of negotiating a non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty. Such a ban can certainly be seen in light of the success of ongoing non-proliferation efforts. On the eve of the twenty-first century the international community needs both more wisdom and more open international negotiation mechanisms having the objective of ensuring a peaceful future. I venture to say that in this undertaking the Republic of Bulgaria will manifest the necessary will and effectiveness.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria for his important statement and the kind words he addressed to the Chair and to my country, which I very much appreciated. I now give the floor to the representative of Ukraine, Mr. Kostyantyn Hryshchenko, Head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Directorate in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Mr. HRYSHCHENKO (Ukraine): Mr. President, first of all accept my congratulations on assuming the high post of President of the Conference on Disarmament.

The beginning of 1994 has been marked by important events. When they are followed by further positive developments it would give hope that the breakthrough in the solution of some of the key problems crucial for further arms reductions and disarmament could be achieved this year. The signing of the Trilateral Statement by the Presidents of Ukraine, the United States of America and Russia on 14 January and the adoption of the resolution by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on 3 February this year have been undoubtedly the most significant events in this area thus far. These documents have removed at last all obstacles in the way of elimination of all nuclear weapons which Ukraine inherited from the former USSR and cleared the way for Ukraine's eventual accession to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty in the shortest possible time.

Since gaining independence - a little more than two years ago - the people of Ukraine have become even more firm in their deeply rooted belief that international security, respect by all States of the fundamental principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter and CSCE documents

(Mr. Hryshchenko, Ukraine)

influence the economic situation and social stability of our State and in the end directly affect the interests of each citizen. The level of concentration of weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons in the area of the former USSR is comparable to that of some notorious regions of tensions and armed conflicts. To minimize - and even better to exclude - the possibility of the use of force in inter-State relations in this region, to steadily reduce and eliminate conventional weapons, all types of weapons of mass destruction and create insurmountable barriers for their proliferation - precisely those tasks were set by Ukraine as priorities of its foreign policy from the very first day of independence.

Evidence of these priorities could be found in documents adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine: the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine, which proclaimed its non-nuclear future, the Military Doctrine and the Fundamental Guidelines of the Foreign Policy of Ukraine which established as the law of the land democratic non-violent principles of foreign and defence policy.

Ratification and strict implementation by Ukraine of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the signing of the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, full compliance with the Convention on the prohibition of biological weapons and a number of other international agreements in the field of arms control also attest to Ukraine's willingness to play a constructive role in the process of disarmament. More clear evidence of this resolve is the decision of Ukraine to withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from its territory ahead of schedule for their elimination, the wide-scale reduction of conventional arms in accordance with the CFE Treaty and, not least, a persistent policy aimed at preventing the re-creation of political and military structures in the geopolitical space of the former USSR that could become the cause for a new division of Europe.

Thus Ukraine from the very outset of its independent existence spared no effort to ensure its joining the international community as a democratic State with a responsible policy in the field of arms control, a policy which would be both in its own interests and in the interests of the whole of mankind.

Having embarked on this path we are facing serious impediments. The critical state of the Ukrainian economy is one of the most important of them, but negative external factors play an even more significant role. We cannot ignore the fact that the mere existence of a sovereign Ukraine provokes fits of allergy in some quarters. Our independence is being perceived as a strange aberration of history which has to be immediately eliminated by all available means. But whatever barriers there are on the path chosen by us, the practical results of Ukraine's efforts in the disarmament field convincingly testify to the consistent and fundamental character of our foreign policy in these matters. At the same time we have to correlate our steps depending on the economic and political situation, on the impact of external factors, with many of those being beyond our control.

(Mr. Hryshchenko, Ukraine)

Ukraine's disarmament priorities for the 1990s are determined both by the obligations undertaken under international agreements which are already in effect as well as the new ones that are only now being elaborated, primarily at the Conference on Disarmament. Ukraine has signed the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and is now actively preparing for its ratification. Together with other States we support the convening of the review conferences on biological and inhumane weapons, and support the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban Treaty (CTBT). We are ready to implement our commitments under the START Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol and we are ready to participate in the search for solutions to other important disarmament problems addressed by the Conference on Disarmament and other international forums.

We believe nobody can have any doubts that Ukraine, as well as a number of other States playing a significant role in international disarmament efforts, should become a full member of the Conference on Disarmament. We are deeply convinced that expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament should not be held hostage to the solution of political differences - notwithstanding how serious they might be - between a member State and an applicant State of the Conference.

A favourable climate for achieving real progress in the field of disarmament, alongside the Trilateral Statement by the Presidents of Ukraine, the United States of America and Russia and the resolution of the Parliament of Ukraine on full ratification of the START Treaty, is being created this year by the NATO declaration on "Partnership for Peace". Ukraine became the first newly independent State to sign this declaration and intends to actively participate in relevant cooperation programmes. NATO's initiative prevents the creation of new walls in Europe that would divide the continent: Western European States on the one hand, and Central and Eastern European States on the other. It also removes suspicions which would inevitably appear in the case of selective extension of NATO membership. Such a non-discriminatory approach, with equal rights for all participants, should, in our view, be the cornerstone of all multilateral agreements to be adopted at the Conference on Disarmament.

A special place in the history of nuclear disarmament will undoubtedly be occupied by a package agreement reached at the Moscow summit on 14 January this year. It is clear that the negotiations which led to the adoption of the Trilateral Statement by the Presidents of Ukraine, the United States of America and Russia were preceded by the decision of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on the ratification of the START Treaty taken on 18 November 1993. Then this decision produced a generally negative reaction in the world, primarily due to the conditions placed by the Verkhovna Rada on Ukraine's accession to the NPT. Among the main conditions spelled out in the above-mentioned resolution the following three are of fundamental importance: provision of security guarantees to Ukraine reconfirming the inviolability of its borders and respect for its territorial integrity by nuclear States; fair compensation for the value of nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of Ukraine; and provision of adequate financial and economic assistance to Ukraine which would allow ecologically safe and active nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Hryshchenko, Ukraine)

In fact, the resolution stated that Ukraine, while voluntarily and unilaterally getting rid of the most effective weapons of mass destruction, expects reciprocal steps on the part of the international community. The President of Ukraine was authorized to find means for the solution of the problem of the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine in the shortest possible time with due respect for the conditions established by the Parliament. Practically immediately after the adoption of this decision Ukraine initiated intensive negotiations, first with the United States and then with Russia, which allowed the President of Ukraine less than two months later to sign the Trilateral Statement.

This package agreement deserves to be addressed in some detail. One of its key elements in the consent of Ukraine to withdraw all nuclear weapons from its territory for their elimination. Ukraine deactivates nuclear weapons deployed on its territory by getting them off combat duty and withdraws all nuclear warheads to Russia for their elimination under supervision by Ukrainian experts. Ukraine also reaffirmed its commitment to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State in the shortest possible time. In turn, the Russian Federation undertook a commitment to provide Ukraine with compensation for all nuclear warheads being withdrawn from Ukraine to Russia for elimination and the United States would provide adequate technical and financial assistance in the elimination of nuclear weapons. Russia as a first step will provide Ukraine within 10 months with fuel assemblies for nuclear power stations containing 100 tons of low-enriched uranium. By the same date at least 200 nuclear warheads from intercontinental ballistic missiles will be transferred to Russia for dismantling.

The most important political aspect of the package is the commitment of the United States, Russia and Great Britain to provide Ukraine with guarantees of its national security once the START-1 Treaty enters into force and Ukraine accedes to the NPT. Thus, the signing of the Trilateral Statement made it possible to realize most of the conditions raised by the Parliament on 18 November 1993.

I would like to express in this connection our high appreciation of the United States efforts aimed at reaching the trilateral package agreement. The initiative and persistence of the United States delegation in seeking rapprochement in the positions of Ukraine and Russia played a key role in arriving at the mutually acceptable compromise.

On 3 February 1994 the Verkhovna Rada adopted the resolution (its text is being distributed as a document of the Conference on Disarmament) where the efforts by the President of Ukraine were approved and previous reservations concerning article V of the Lisbon Protocol were removed. The President was authorized by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to exchange instruments of ratification on START. Practical implementation of the agreements reached in Moscow will encourage a positive decision in the very near future by the Parliament on accession to the non-proliferation Treaty.

(Mr. Hryshchenko, Ukraine)

Here we have all the more reasons to be optimistic as the Ukrainian-Russian negotiations on practical aspects of Trilateral Statement implementation, held in Kiev on 10 February, were a success and produced some very important and tangible results.

Steadily pursuing the path of elimination of all its nuclear arsenal, Ukraine naturally is interested in seeing to it that the process of nuclear disarmament embraces all nuclear States, that it becomes universal and irreversible. The decision of the Conference on Disarmament to renew the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban Treaty is an important step in this direction. This decision is important both in essence and as a symbol. It marks a new stage in the multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament. Ukraine believes that drafting of the treaty in the near future is quite possible. The result will be the end to the development of new types of nuclear weapons and strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. We are convinced that the future treaty should be open for both non-nuclear and nuclear-weapon States. The Treaty should include protocols on verification activity as an integral part.

Ukraine supports India's position that participation in verification activity under the treaty has to be non-discriminatory, provide equal rights and establish the same obligations for all States as well as requiring equal implementation of the CTBT provisions. We are for the creation of an effective verification mechanism which under appropriate conditions would provide for the possibility of reimbursement of expenses incurred in carrying out such activity.

Ukraine considers negotiations on a CTBT an important element of strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and of preparations for the NPT review conference. We believe that it is quite realistic to set the goal of reaching agreement on the text of the treaty before the review conference is convened in April 1995. Being guided by the desire to conclude the CTBT as soon as possible, we consider it to be important that political, legal and verification aspects of the CTBT be discussed in parallel. Ukraine treats with understanding the desire of the five nuclear States to have a key role in the drafting of the conceptual provisions of the CTBT, but we are convinced that each State should have an opportunity to make its contribution to the drafting of the treaty. First of all, this concerns the successor States to the nuclear arsenal of the former USSR as well as the States which have a "threshold-level" nuclear capability.

Being the State which for the first time in the history of mankind has chosen the course of complete elimination of nuclear weapons deployed on its territory, Ukraine is attaching priority importance to the work of the Conference on Disarmament on the issue of security guarantees to non-nuclear States. As a first step we would welcome a joint declaration or any other legally binding document worked out by the nuclear States concerning non-use of nuclear weapons against States which do not posses them. Such obligations would be additional evidence of the readiness of nuclear States to respect the legitimate security interests of the States which follow the path of nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Hryshchenko, Ukraine)

Later on the nuclear States should be ready to assume clearly defined international legal commitments concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States and refraining from the threat of use of such weapons. We are deeply convinced that any such guarantees should be unconditional in character and rule out any exceptions to the ban on the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States. It is obvious that the provision of such guarantees as well as the conclusion of the CTBT will create a favourable environment for the successful review of the non-proliferation Treaty and its extension.

The issue of the prevention of the arms race in outer space is closely linked to the whole complex of nuclear disarmament problems. Ukraine stands for the adoption of concrete measures which would put a reliable barrier in the way of an arms race in outer space, while making possible the use of available missile technologies for peaceful purposes. Being a State with a highly advanced aerospace industry, Ukraine endeavours to cooperate with other States in the peaceful exploration of space. We intend to conduct negotiations and accede to the MTCR and abide by the relevant commitments stipulated by this regime in the very near future.

Nowadays when the international community is consistently adopting international conventions on elimination of biological and chemical and other weapons of mass destruction, we resolutely oppose any attempts to create new types of weapons of mass destruction. Ukraine notes with satisfaction that the issue of new types of weapons of mass destruction has been put on the agenda of the Conference, including the issue of radiological weapons, the use of which might have effects comparable to the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster.

While the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction deserves the highest priority, we must not overlook the importance of international efforts in the field of reduction of conventional weapons. As was demonstrated during the Gulf war, unlimited and uncontrolled transfers of conventional weapons can destabilize a whole region, and thus provoke an armed conflict. It goes without saying that supplier States have to conduct a responsible policy in this field. But it is also the responsibility of the international community to undertake coordinated measures aimed at prevention of the unregulated and uncontrolled sale of weapons. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms is an important element of international efforts in this field. Ukraine shares and supports the purposes of this regime, and first of all the achievement of greater transparency in the sphere of the transfer of armaments. In our view, in addition to the global approach, regional cooperation should be promoted as well. This would include the development of additional measures on transparency adjusted to the specific conditions existing in each region. Ukraine supports the decision of the Conference to continue the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments in 1994, and has the intention to furnish data to the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms on an annual basis.

(Mr. Hryshchenko, Ukraine)

In conclusion I would like to express the hope that the 1994 session of the Conference on Disarmament will be extremely productive and memorable due to the adoption of important decisions which would contribute to the strengthening of peace and international security. Ukraine is ready to make its productive input into the work of the Conference on Disarmament and make a substantial contribution to the realization of its ambitious agenda in the capacity of a full-fledged member of this highly esteemed international body.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Ukraine for his statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Brotodiningrat.

Mr. BROTODININGRAT (Indonesia) (translated from French): Allow me first of all, Sir, to say how happy the Indonesian delegation is to see you in the Chair of the Conference on Disarmament. We are convinced that with your distinguished personal qualities and your rich diplomatic experience you will successfully guide the start-up of our work for 1994. I would also like to pay tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Mounir Zahran of Egypt, for the exemplary way he guided us through a difficult period of transition. I also congratulate our new Secretary-General, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, and his deputy Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, on their well-deserved appointment. Permit me to take this opportunity to welcome our new colleagues, the Ambassadors of Algeria, Argentina, Ethiopia, Italy and Venezuela. Lastly, my delegation would also like to greet the honourable Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria and the honourable representative of Ukraine and thank them for their important statements.

(continued in English)

At the outset, I would like to reiterate the considered view of my delegation that the drastic reduction of the threat of nuclear war with the end of the cold war should in no way be perceived as diminishing the need for nuclear disarmament, and hence enabling us to relax our efforts. On the contrary, the welcome improvement that has dramatically marked the relationship between the nuclear Powers represents a critical momentum which must be generated through more active and serious efforts towards the achievement of effective nuclear disarmament. Many references have been made by various delegations in this Conference on Disarmament to the fact that the new and improved international political climate has provided us with solid ground on which to advance negotiations on both conventional and unconventional weapons. What is now needed is to follow up these references, and to build upon our success with the chemical weapons Convention, with a common resolve and concrete actions. It is against such an arrière-pensée that I should like, at this juncture, to briefly address the issue of the comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT), the non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and their interrelationship.

With regard to a CTBT, there have been a series of appreciable grounds for hope which indicate that we are indeed on the right track. The continuing observance of the nuclear-test moratoria by the majority of the nuclear-weapon

(Mr. Brotodiningrat, Indonesia)

States, the Conference's decision of 10 August 1993 to give the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate, the subsequent acceptance by the Conference, thanks to the untiring efforts of our distinguished Japanese colleague Ambassador Tanaka, of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee, and the consensus adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of resolution 48/70 on a CTBT - as well as the appointment of another distinguished colleague, Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico, to chair the Ad Hoc Committee - do represent major steps in the right direction. It is the hope of my delegation that the Conference on Disarmament could further capitalize on those positive developments by avoiding protracted discussions on procedural and non-substantive matters and instead "speedily taking the bull by the horns".

In this context, we are encouraged to note the statement by the distinguished Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. John Holum, before this Conference on Disarmament plenary two weeks ago, particularly when he underlined the United States policy as announced by President Clinton on 3 July 1993, strongly supporting the conclusion of a CTBT at the earliest possible time. We call on all other nuclear-weapon States to follow this example by making the same commitment, thereby widening the window of opportunity for the achievement of a CTBT. For its part, Indonesia's commitment to the achievement of a CTBT is beyond question. In the last five years we have spearheaded efforts toward this end through the PTBT amendment conference and it is in pursuance of the same objective that we stand ready to reinforce such efforts through the Conference on Disarmament.

Now that agreement has been reached on the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee, the object of a CTBT which we are aiming for has been further clarified. It must be universal, comprehensive and multilaterally and effectively verifiable. While, of course, fully agreeing with this, my delegation is of the opinion that the principle of universality should be seen as a common objective rather than as an individual precondition. All of us should aim towards adhering to the treaty, rather than each and every one of us waiting until the rest have joined. As for the principle of comprehensiveness, we share the view that the scope of a CTBT should also cover peaceful nuclear explosions as well as testing through super-computer simulation. We feel that comprehensive coverage is needed to prevent vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons in the future. With regard to the principle of verifiability, we hold the view that the verification system would be made more effective if the current seismic method could be supplemented with, and refined through, other non-seismic techniques. As far as the time-frame is concerned, we support the call to conclude a CTBT before the NPT review and extension conference in 1995, and this brings me to the issue of the interrelationship between a CTBT and the NPT.

The view expressed by many of us on the desirability of concluding a CTBT before the NPT review and extension conference does represent a general feeling that there is a link between a CTBT and the NPT. We share that general feeling. Indeed it has always been the opinion of my delegation that

(Mr. Brotodiningrat, Indonesia)

not only will a CTBT make vertical proliferation much more difficult, but also that it can be expected to drastically reduce the risk of horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, my delegation is more cautious when it comes to jumping to the conclusion that a CTBT represents a guarantee for an indefinite extension of the NPT. This caution emanates from the capital importance that we attach to article VI of the NPT, which clearly provides that "each of the Parties to the Treaty [i.e. each nuclear-weapon State] undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control". It is obvious from the reading of this article that, without in any way belittling its significance, a CTBT should be perceived as just an important step in the right direction toward an effective NPT. Important as it may be, it should not be regarded as the basic justification for an indefinite extension of the NPT. Even less desirable would be for us to entertain the idea of a loose time-frame for the CTBT negotiation and, worse still, to treat this CTBT as a "hostage" of the NPT extension.

Turning now to the subject of the NPT, let me first observe that references are increasingly being made to the shortcomings of the Treaty. These, in our view, should not be seen as a negative development, but should be constructively directed towards strengthening the Treaty in the context of the preparations for the 1995 NPT review and extension conference. The two most frequently quoted NPT shortcomings are, undoubtedly, the divisiveness which it has created between the "haves" and the "have-nots" in relation to articles I, II, III and IX on the one hand, and the doubtful compliance with article VI by the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the other. At this point, my delegation would venture to think aloud and mention two other related issues in the present NPT which perhaps need our closer attention. The first issue is the asymmetry between the control and verification mechanism relating to the non-nuclear-weapon States and those relating to the nuclear-weapon States. Whereas, by virtue of article III, all non-nuclear weapon States parties to the Treaty have accepted the IAEA safeguards system for the exclusive purpose of the verification of the fulfilment of their obligations assumed under the Treaty, no mechanism whatsoever is foreseen in the Treaty to control and verify the fulfilment of the obligations of the nuclear-weapon States, such as stipulated under article VI. The second issue pertains to the extremely difficult amendment procedures required by article VIII of the Treaty. Our concern over this issue is increasing, particularly in connection with the growing pressure for the indefinite extension of the NPT, which may leave amendment procedures as the only possible opportunity for subsequent improvements. Hence the prospect of running the risk of perpetuating the present shortcomings.

To conclude on a positive note, my delegation is looking forward to a productive negotiation in the Ad Hoc Committee on an NTB and serious preparations for the 1995 NPT review and extension conference. We stand ready to extend our full and active cooperation in this extremely important exercise.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Indonesia for his statement.

(continued in English)

I wish to express my gratitude for the kind words and best wishes addressed to the presidency, and also to congratulate him for his mastery of the French language, which I see is gaining momentum in the Conference. As a token of my intent to reciprocate, and with his utmost indulgence, I wish to say in Indonesian Tuan duta besar, terima kasih banyak atas kata-kata pujiannya -

(continued in French)

which for those who might not be familiar with it means "Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador, for your kind words".

I now give the floor to the representative of Hungary, Ambassador Boytha.

Mr. BOYTHA (Hungary) (translated from French): Since my delegation is taking the floor for the first time under your presidency, Sir, allow me to offer my congratulations to you on taking up your duties. I would also like to congratulate you on the way you have been guiding our discussions, and your elegant and innovative style, and the manner of addressing the problems facing us.

(continued in English)

At the same time, I should like to extend our cordial welcome to the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General and Secretary-General of our Conference, His Excellency Vladimir Petrovsky, and also to his deputy, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail. Your experience, personal authority and professional knowledge are the best guarantees for the development of our work.

The Conference on Disarmament started its 1994 session under promising conditions. The last few months brought considerable progress in the vital areas of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The success of the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 1995 NPT conference and the most welcome intention of further countries possessing significant nuclear industry to join the NPT proves that the global nuclear non-proliferation regime is not only alive but has a growing appeal to States yet outside its framework. The agreements reached during the recent Moscow summit also raised hopes for strengthening regional as well as global confidence and security. We trust that the realization of these commitments is going to be a smooth process and will not contradict the progressive spirit we witnessed in January.

So far the Conference on Disarmament has always succeeded in surmounting the obstacles that emerged in the way of its negotiations. In 1992 the Conference faced the challenge of overcoming deep divisions and concluding the chemical weapons Convention. That process gave ample proof that a common

(Mr. Boytha, Hungary)

denominator can be found even between basically different conceptual approaches if there is a willingness to negotiate and compromise. In 1993, just a few weeks after the chemical weapons Convention had been signed by more than 100 States, a number of opening statements raised a quiet question mark about the very sense of the CD's future. Yet again, the Conference stepped up and responded positively, by mandating an Ad Hoc Committee on the promising issue of transparency in armaments, conducting a lively and progressive debate in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and reaching a breakthrough decision to give this Committee a negotiating mandate. I do sincerely hope that at the beginning of the 1995 session we will be able to look back at 1994 as a year that kept up with the emerging trend.

One should have no doubts that the success of the 1994 session will be judged mainly on the basis of the progress we are able to achieve in the Ad Hoc Committee on banning nuclear tests. Only a collective effort of all participants can help us attain this goal. On its part, Hungary is ready to take its share of responsibility and participate actively in the upcoming negotiations. I would like to reiterate that Hungary has always been and continues to be a staunch supporter of a total prohibition of all nuclear explosions in all environments for all time and advocates the earliest possible conclusion of a nuclear test ban. Such a ban has to be universally applicable to all States whether possessing nuclear weapons or not.

In our reading the future treaty should not differentiate between nuclear-weapon tests and so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. The notion of widening the scope from the strict interpretation of banning nuclear explosions to also prohibiting certain kinds of associated activities merits further intellectual investment. It is obvious that assistance to other countries to engage in nuclear testing would run contrary to the purpose and the spirit of a comprehensive ban on nuclear explosions. The five nuclear-weapon States have already entered comparable obligations under the NPT, but this circle has to be widened. The Conference should also carry on exploring the possibilities of prohibiting preparatory activities, even though the issues of appropriate definition and verification in this field seem to be the most tricky obstacles on the road ahead.

Just as in the case of the chemical weapons Convention, the verification regime will constitute the backbone of the future treaty. We believe that verifying the CTBT should not be a political but rather a technical issue. The elements of the required technology are already at our disposal, waiting only to be integrated into an adequate system. This system should meet three basic criteria, namely technical effectiveness, cost-effectiveness and transparency. The core of the verification system will undoubtedly be formed by a seismic monitoring network, which pushes the activities of the seismological expert group even more to the forefront of interest. For long periods in the past, this group has virtually been the only place where practical and progressive work was conducted having in mind the issue of banning nuclear tests. The experience gained from the two series of technical tests have already provided answers to numerous questions that would pop up only at later stages of the negotiating process.

(Mr. Boytha, Hungary)

The full-scale phase of the third test aimed at developing, testing and evaluating an experimental international seismic monitoring system is scheduled to commence on 1 January 1995 and run without a definite time-limit. It gives me great pleasure to inform you that Hungary will - for the first time - participate in the test run of the seismological data network. May I express once again our gratitude to the Government of Germany for their cooperation that enabled us to create the technical background required for our involvement?

We have to take due care that concentrating our efforts on the nuclear test ban do not render other items on the agenda insignificant. The issue of negative security assurances has been an agenda item where progress has proved to be elusive during the years. In fact, since the relevant part of the ill-fated draft final document of the fourth NPT review conference was drafted through painstaking negotiations in 1990, many of the key players have shown a fading willingness to enter serious discussions on the subject. There is no doubt in my mind, however, that this situation is about to change during the 1994 session. It has to. Both on legal and moral grounds, the countries renouncing the nuclear option in an internationally and legally binding form and acting in full compliance with their obligations have a legitimate right to be assured against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In our view, the optimum format for security assurances would be a legally binding, multilaterally negotiated international agreement. Such an agreement, by nature, will have to be based on mutual obligations by both the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States. Keeping in mind that present realities might not provide for achieving these goals in a fortnight, we are also ready to consider what intermediary steps might lead us closer to our objective. At the same time we are convinced that discussions on the subject should be carried on in a multilateral framework, as a different approach would run contrary to the idea of balanced mutual obligations on both sides and could pose further difficulties.

Yet another crucial issue ahead of us is the cut-off of the production of nuclear materials for weapons purposes. A solution for this problem is long overdue. The process of nuclear disarmament has created a favourable environment for the attainment of this objective within a relatively short time-frame. I am convinced that even the nuclear Powers themselves would prefer a quick and safe manner to dispose of relevant nuclear material rather than continue production with all the related security and environmental problems more than frightening already. At this stage allow me to mention only two elements of this highly complex problem, namely framework and scope. We share the view that the Conference on Disarmament - both on procedural and substantive grounds - provides an ideal framework for negotiations. We should, however, make every possible effort to make the best use of the vast experience accumulated by the International Atomic Energy Agency and our colleagues in Vienna. The closest cooperation would not simply facilitate the work within the CD, it is the basic condition of success from the early stages on. As far as the scope is concerned, differing views were expressed as to whether existing stockpiles of relevant fissionable material should also be taken under some form of supervisory mechanism. While understanding the

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security concerns of those opposing such a notion, one has to consider that restricting the scope of a future agreement would limit its effectiveness and could also weaken its universal appeal.

The issues of a nuclear test ban, negative security assurances and a cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes deserve utmost attention on their own merit, but the upcoming extension and review conference of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty is likely to contribute as a multiplying factor to their significance. The global nuclear non-proliferation regime would benefit enormously from early and substantive progress in these areas. A successful NPT conference in 1995 would also give further momentum to the negotiations within the CD. The correlation between these processes, however, should be handled in a very cautious manner. We cannot but oppose any misinterpretation of this sensitive relationship that would create a formal and artificial linkage. In our judgement, such an approach would endanger the future of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and diminish the chance for success within the CD. Supporting both the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT and the earliest possible conclusion of negotiations in the Conference on the mentioned issues, we certainly share the belief that an "all or nothing" approach poses unacceptable risks and might end up with reaching the less favourable option.

Last but not least, I wish to stress that increased openness and transparency have gained wide recognition in matters of international security. In fact, the notion of transparency is present in nearly every item on our agenda, be it the concept of open seismic stations, the problem of data accessibility in the NTB verification system or the need for a transparent negotiating process on other questions. The issue of transparency in armaments, which is about to celebrate its second anniversary on the agenda of the Conference, is also an expression of the recognition that transparency and openness can have a significant contribution to reducing tensions and enhancing stability. Existing transparency regimes, like the United Nations standardized system for reporting military expenditure or the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, add further pieces to the emerging trend and serve as reliable proof that transparency is not merely a useful but an ever more indispensable element of the new generation of tools backing up preventive diplomacy. We keep emphasizing that transparency in armaments is basically a cooperative undertaking, giving participants an impetus on the road to building trust. The possibilities of its development should be continuously explored.

The initial experience we have gained so far in these areas is necessarily marked by the difficulties of pioneering. More than 80 countries, including the most important exporters of arms, replied to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. This covers some 50 per cent of the United Nations membership, but one should also keep in mind that these countries provide for more than 90 per cent of global arms exports. Quite a number of States have already indicated further possibilities of developing the register by entering information not only on transfers of arms but also data about military holdings, responding to the general invitation to this

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end. Due to the limited time available, the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments could only take a first look at a number of promising and exciting ideas. In a number of instances we reached the phase of formulating general objectives of our work which, however, call for further definitions that would enable us to proceed to the elaboration of appropriate means of pursuing them.

The task in front of us during the course of this year is to explore possible ways and means of increasing transparency in arms. Our starting basis should be the strong and stable foundation laid down by the Ad Hoc Committee last year under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Zahran of Egypt. Based on the assumption that the very purpose of transparency and openness is the building of confidence and security, the prevention of armed conflicts and the promotion of disarmament, I am convinced that the Conference on Disarmament has a definite role to play in this field during the foreseeable future. Allow me, at this point, to express my gratitude to the members of the Conference for the trust and honour bestowed on my country and myself with the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments. I want to take this opportunity to give to the Conference my assurances that I will certainly use all my best endeavours to advance our work on the TIA agenda.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Hungary for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. And in order that the Chair may not be accused of partiality, I would like to say to him Köszönöm nagykövet úr kedves szavait, melyek mélyen érintettek, which, had it been properly pronounced, would mean "Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for your kind words, which deeply touched me".

I now give the floor to the representative of Chile, Ambassador Cubillos.

Mr. CUBILLOS (Chile) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, first of all please accept my delegation's congratulations on taking up the Chair of the Conference in this first month of meetings, which is always a crucial time to chart out the course of work for the year. In this regard I would like to emphasize that under your leadership the Conference has made rapid headway in re-establishing the working committees and in electing their chairmen. At the same time I would like to extend my congratulations to the Secretary-General of the Conference, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, and the Deputy Secretary-General, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail.

I have asked for the floor this morning to inform the Conference that at the eighth special General Conference of the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL), Chile, along with Argentina, ratified the amendments made to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and made a waiver declaration pursuant to article 28, thereby becoming a full party to the Treaty.

Chile was one of the instigators of the movement that led to the 1967 signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco which, on the one hand, bans nuclear weapons and the use of atomic energy for warlike purposes and, on the other, establishes a denuclearized zone, that is to say a territorial zone of

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application composed of land, sea and air space within which no activity contrary to the agreement may be carried out. Chile ratified this Treaty in October 1974, but its application remained pending as it was considered necessary that all States with nuclear capabilities in the region should effectively become parties to the agreement. In order to attain this end, at the initiative of President Patricio Aylwin, Chile, together with Argentina and Brazil, proposed some specific amendments designed to develop it and update it. Once the amendments had been approved by the National Congress, the Government of Chile considered that the time had come to complete its incorporation in the system banning nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. In order to do this, in consultation with Argentina, it decided to deposit the ratifications of the aforementioned amendments and to make the waiver declaration referred to earlier. It should be said that the Treaty had not entered fully into effect because this required ratification by all the signatory countries, which had not occurred until then.

The step taken by Argentina and Chile is of great importance since it brings them in as full parties to the Treaty and this is now fully operational in all aspects for them. Our country also takes on certain important obligations in the light of the new commitments entered into in the Treaty of Tlatelolco, including that of negotiating a broad safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency that would permit international inspection of all nuclear facilities and activities in the country. This process has already been initiated.

Once the amendments had been ratified and the above-mentioned declaration made, our country joined OPANAL, and on that occasion the President of the Chilean delegation, Ambassador Carlos Portales, the Director-General of Foreign Policy in the Chilean Foreign Ministry, said that with this step Chile hoped that our region would be consolidated as a place of peace and mutual trust, where uncertainty would disappear and the spirit of contact would prevail. He added that the undeniable fact that Latin America is currently one of the most specific regions of the globe renews hopes that any contribution it makes to the cause of peace and security is necessary and no less significant. The Director-General said that this makes it necessary to continue to move forward through new commitments and to improve existing instruments, and finally added that by this act the Chilean Government wished to emphasize its total renunciation and rejection of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to show its commitment to make a substantial contribution to the development of this cause. Lastly, the Director-General offered our country as a venue for the next regular meeting of OPANAL.

The incorporation of Chile in the Treaty of Tlatelolco is occurring at a time when this Conference is beginning to effectively negotiate a nuclear-test-ban treaty, a long hoped-for wish of the international community. It is a happy coincidence, since my country has resolutely supported efforts to prevent testing. In this respect we would like to restate our commitment to work for a treaty which will be complete, universal and verifiable.

(Mr. Cubillos, Chile)

Before coming to the end of this statement, I would also like to reiterate to the Conference Chile's support for the proposal submitted two weeks ago by the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico on the expansion of this body, since it effectively contributes to progress in a process that has already taken up much time and demands a solution. We hope that this initiative will meet with the necessary consensus and that the consultations on its application will be initiated soon.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Chile for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now call on the representative of Myanmar, Ambassador Hlaing.

Mr. HLAING (Myanmar): Mr. President, it gives me great pleasure to see you presiding over this important body, the Conference on Disarmament. I am confident that your demonstrated diplomatic skills and expertise in the field of disarmament will be invaluable inputs to the work of the CD during the crucial first month of its 1994 session. Our tribute also goes to your predecessor, Ambassador Zahran of Egypt, whose energetic and effective presidency during the closing month of the 1993 session of the CD and the inter-sessional period has been a source of satisfaction and inspiration to my delegation. May I offer the warmest congratulations of the Myanmar delegation to our new Secretary-General and Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, and our new Deputy Secretary-General, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, on the assumption of their respective high offices?

We shall miss our colleague Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan of Australia, who is leaving us soon to assume an important responsibility in the Department of Foreign Affairs in Canberra. We wish him all the best and further successes in his new endeavours. I should also like to welcome to our midst the Ambassadors of Algeria, Brazil, Ethiopia, Venezuela, Argentina and Italy, who have just joined us in the CD. We look forward to having close professional and personal ties with them all. We wish them every success during their tours of duty in Geneva.

I shall devote my statement today to the nuclear issues on the agenda. When this Conference completed its negotiation of the draft Convention on chemical weapons, doubt was cast on the future of the CD. My delegation is delighted to find the CD, one year afterwards, continuing as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, as vibrant and vigorous as ever. In fact, the CD is passing through a very important epoch in its history, namely the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. This is very welcome, as my delegation has all along held the view that it should indeed give the nuclear issues the top priority which they deserve.

Resolution 48/70, entitled "Comprehensive test-ban treaty", sponsored by a record number of 157 co-sponsors and adopted without a vote at the recently concluded forty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly, sends a clear signal that the whole international community

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favours the early conclusion of a CTBT. We in the CD should therefore spare no effort to undertake intensive negotiations with a view to reaching a final draft text of a CTBT before the conclusion of the 1994 session.

We are aware that a CTBT cannot be a letter-perfect constraint against manufacturing of any nuclear explosive devices such as clandestine manufacture of crude nuclear devices. Despite such shortcomings, a universal, multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty will curb and prevent the qualitative improvement, development and proliferation of nuclear weapons, and development of nuclear-related space weapons. It will thereby contribute to the cause of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and the enhancement of international peace and security.

Never in the history of the CD have we had a better opportunity to negotiate a CTBT than at present. Never has the international political and security environment been more favourable. It is therefore imperative for all of us to seize this rare opportunity to bring the negotiation of a CTBT to a successful conclusion in a most expeditious manner. The present nuclear testing moratorium, declared or de facto, observed by the nuclear-weapon States is also another factor helpful to the negotiation process in the CD. We hope that this will be maintained throughout the period of the negotiation process.

In the view of my delegation, a CTBT should, inter alia, embody the following elements and principles. The scope of a CTBT should be comprehensive; the treaty should ban all nuclear-test explosions in all environments for all time. The ban should also cover so-called peaceful nuclear explosions, which are practically indistinguishable from nuclear-weapon tests and which have little practical use for genuinely peaceful purposes. The treaty should be non-discriminatory, universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable. The treaty should be of unlimited duration. The verification regime should be multilateral in character and must have the capacity to effectively monitor compliance with the provisions of the treaty on a global scale. Seismic monitoring should constitute the central element of the verification, to be supplemented by other technical means such as radionuclide sensing and satellite photography, and by on-site inspections. The verification system should not be too cumbersome; it should be cost-effective. The on-site inspection procedure should be used only on rare occasions as a measure of last resort; and should not be unnecessarily intrusive. The treaty should not contain any provision that could be interpreted as restricting the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

As regards the definition of nuclear tests, my delegation subscribes to the view that such a definition should be simple, practical, and easy to apply. The definition of "any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion", contained in article 1 of the 1963 partial test-ban treaty, is still relevant and meets our requirements. We will do well to adopt this time-tested, practical and useful definition, or to use it as a

(Mr. Hlaing, Myanmar)

basis to work out an appropriate formulation. My delegation feels that we should avoid unnecessary protracted negotiations on what will constitute a nuclear-test explosion.

Despite the complexity of technical issues, the principal barriers to be overcome to achieve a CTBT are political, not technical. As far back as 1972, the Secretary-General of the United Nations declared that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem had been so fully explored that only a political decision was necessary to achieve final agreement on a CTB. We do not therefore see any reason why we should not be able to conclude a CTBT expeditiously, once political decisions are taken on key issues.

Turning to agenda item 2, my delegation welcomes the appointment of a Special Coordinator on the question of the prohibition of fissile materials for nuclear-weapon purposes under agenda item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". This is a new subject to be considered by the CD for the first time. The importance of the subject cannot be over-emphasized, as there is an organic relationship between this subject and the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. My delegation hopes that the consultations of the Special Coordinator will be fruitful and will soon lead to the commencement of negotiations on this issue.

Another agenda item which the CD should give high priority is agenda item 5, "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". My delegation believes that the best guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons is the total elimination of these horrendous weapons from the face of the Earth. Pending the achievement of this goal, it is imperative for the international community to develop and put in place legally binding, effective international measures or arrangements for negative security assurances. NSA has been on the agenda of the CD since 1979. Since then, except for a year or two, the Ad Hoc Committee on NSA has been re-established by the CD every year with a full negotiating mandate. Despite this, no tangible progress has been made to-date. Lack of progress in this area is attributable to the political environment of the cold war. The end of the cold war and recent positive changes in the international political climate have now created favourable conditions for making substantive progress on NSA.

My delegation feels that the negative security assurances given by the nuclear-weapon States need to be improved upon in two ways. First, these assurances should be transformed into a legally binding treaty or arrangements. Secondly, limitations and conditionalities in the assurances should be eliminated.

The question of negative security assurances is important in its own right, because it relates to the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. Furthermore, it will enhance international peace and security.

(Mr. Hlaing, Myanmar)

My delegation feels that CTBT and NSA are essential elements in an effective regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Tangible results in these areas will go a long way in making the 1995 NPT review conference a success.

Mr. PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Myanmar for his statement and the kind words he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ambassador Nasseri.

Mr. NASSERI (Islamic Republic of Iran) (translated from French): I am sure, Mr. President, that you are probably not planning to say a few words in Farsi today, so I will begin by saying

(continued in English)

Thank you, Mr. President.

At the outset, I congratulate you on the assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. With your diplomatic skill and experience, I am convinced that we will be able to fulfil successfully our mandate, especially at this juncture of beginning our deliberations. I assure you of full cooperation and support from my delegation. I would like to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Zahran of Egypt, for the effective manner he conducted our work and his tireless efforts during the final phase of last year's Conference and the inter-sessional period.

I should also congratulate Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky on the new posting as the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General. His immense experience and diplomatic skill are valuable assets that the Conference stands to benefit highly from. My congratulation is also extended to Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail for his appointment as the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference. As was shown during the CWC negotiations his professionalism is of the highest importance to our work. We very much appreciate his presence among us. I welcome the new representatives, Ambassador Lampreia of Brazil, Ambassador Arnau of Argentina, Ambassador Omar of Ethiopia, Ambassador Meghlaoui of Algeria, Ambassador Murzi of Venezuela and Ambassador Vattani of Italy, who joined us recently. I wish them all the best and success.

Today, I intend to take the opportunity to address the issue of expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament. This, in our view, is a very important question that has a direct relation to the credibility and relevance of the CD and its status as the sole multilateral negotiating body for disarmament.

Ever since its inception this Conference has provided a forum for discussions on a number of important disarmament issues. Yet, even after the cold war, the Conference is still unable to engage into negotiations on the most prominent and pertinent disarmament issues, such as nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Nasseri, Islamic Republic of Iran)

For nearly two decades leading up to 1992, it is, I believe, fair to say that the chemical weapons Convention constituted the sole issue upon which real negotiations were taking place and that perhaps was the sole reason for the CD's relevance. The Conference reached its climax last year, with its success in finalizing the chemical weapons Convention. But since every peak is followed with a slope the question was properly raised, at the same time, as to how the CD can maintain the credibility, even the popularity, it earned through the successful conclusion of the CWC in the future of its work.

It was in this light that the Conference eventually focused its work on issues for which negotiations were more possible and the possibility of arriving at a conclusion more feasible. This, of course, is not the most desirable approach as the CD, in our view, will not have discharged its responsibilities unless it is enabled to deal, in full, with all prominent disarmament issues.

It was also felt, more than before, that the CD should open its doors to other members who are interested to participate in its activities. Throughout the years, there has been a number of countries who have contributed, some even decisively, to the negotiations and deliberations of this body. At this new juncture in time and, particularly, with the demise of the cold war it has become inconceivable not to grant these countries the privilege of full membership and therefore provide them with the opportunity for more complete and comprehensive participation in the work of the Conference.

My country has, from the outset, been one of the supporters and even a proponent of the expansion of CD membership. It has been our persistent view that not only can we benefit from an enrichment of our discussions but also, through becoming even more representative of the international community, add to our credibility. As such, we were in full support of the work that Ambassador O'Sullivan was carrying out throughout last year. In the final stage, if we may now be able to call last year's exercise a final one, we were able to render our complete support to the countries proposed by Ambassador O'Sullivan as new members, save for one: Israel.

Our objection to Israel's entry has, inter alia, its political reasons. Yet, here, we explained our view solely on the basis of what relates directly to our work, i.e., Israel's nuclear policies. Israel has persistently followed a programme of nuclear weapons and on the basis of various reliable accounts it is, today, a nuclear-weapons-capable country. At the same time it has refused to join the NPT and has failed to submit its nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards and inspections. Thus it was and it is our firm position that Israel should be banned from entering this body as a member of the CD. The very least that should be required of Israel is to demand a mere indication that these policies, policies which seriously threaten the security of countries in our region including that of my own, are about to change. This indication is, as you know, yet to arrive.

On the other hand, based on our eager enthusiasm to see other members included in Ambassador O'Sullivan's list enter the CD as new members, and following persuasive diplomacy with the help of Ambassador Mounir Zahran who

(Mr. Nasseri, Islamic Republic of Iran)

presided over the Conference at the time, we agreed not to block a decision on the basis of an understanding that was reached then. I must say that anyone who has an elementary knowledge of the political situation in our region can realize how difficult it was for us to come to this decision. The essence of the understanding was that the CD, as a whole, would reflect on the concerns that we raised about Israel's nuclear policies; a concern, incidentally, that is shared by many others.

All those efforts have failed, however, because in the final decisive meeting of the 1993 CD plenary session one CD member raised its objection to the entry of another country. That created a stalemate and impasse which has been proved to be extremely difficult to break. Yet, what was more significant for us was the manner in which this objection was expressed. For in the statement on Iraq it was stressed, as a position from the capital, that any criticism of Israel is considered as "outrageous" and that Israel should enter the CD with its nuclear policy intact. This position, coming from a very influential CD member, ran in complete contradiction to the essence of the understanding which had been reached to make it possible for O'Sullivan's package to pass.

Therefore my delegation went on record, in the same meeting, that we had come prepared to welcome new members to the CD. But, because of that intervention, a new situation had been created in which the understanding so intricately arrived at had effectively been nullified. That situation, I must say, remains the same today.

In this midst, we have just recently been presented with a proposal which divides the question of new membership into two stages. A proposal made under the name of my dear colleague and friend, Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico, whom I should take this opportunity to congratulate on his election as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. As I understand, on the basis of this, the package proposed by Ambassador O'Sullivan will be adopted but a decision on the timing of the actual entry of the new member will remain pending. This proposal therefore seems to be a procedural gimmick which by no means resolves the problems or even moves us towards a solution but, in a way, gives us a possibility to evade the problem and refrain from tackling it for the time being.

For the last few days, I've had several discussions with interested colleagues including a number of those whose countries are included in the list of Ambassador O'Sullivan. I believe I can fairly conclude that the only merit in the two-stage proposal is that it will limit the work of the special coordinator who is to be appointed to follow up the question this year. On this basis he will have nothing to say or do about the list of other countries which have applied for membership. He may then only continue to hold consultations to see how the entry of the new members within the package may become possible.

(Mr. Nasseri, Islamic Republic of Iran)

There is also perhaps another merit in the sense that the CD can relieve itself from the pressure of this issue. It may be possible then to say that if the CD has not been successful in making a full decision, at least it has made a half-decision, and therefore there has been progress.

But my question remains: are we not, in a way, simply deceiving ourselves by assuming that part of the problem has been resolved and only another part remains? Moreover, it is common knowledge that some members prefer to postpone the expansion as much as possible and, specifically, until the negotiations on a CTBT have been concluded. Are we not, through this proposal, reducing pressure for a prompt decision and helping those who wish to see the whole idea shelved for some time?

Let us be clear with ourselves. There is a major problem because one country has tied the entry of Iraq to a political issue. In fact, by stressing that Iraq could enter the CD as a full-fledged member only after it has implemented, in full, all the resolutions of the Security Council related to the Persian Gulf war, a linkage has been made between the package of Ambassador O'Sullivan with perhaps one of the most difficult and ambiguous political questions of our time. As long as this linkage remains, one could not perceive that the package will translate itself into actual new membership in the near future.

As I just expressed we as Iran have a position against the entry of Israel; a position that is bound to remain intact after the understanding so delicately reached last year was broken with the intervention made by another delegation during the plenary meeting. Thus, I believe the only way to move forward and to establish a compromise that will be of benefit to us - to all of us - is to loosen the ties within Ambassador O'Sullivan's package.

My delegation, on the basis of its principled positions, cannot support a proposal that quite clearly postpones a solution or even makes it more unlikely. We believe firmly that many countries within O'Sullivan's package deserve to enter the CD as members, immediately and without delay, as even now is too late. The CD should no longer be deprived of the benefit it can earn from full participation by these members. On this basis, my delegation can only support a two-stage proposal with the following elements. First, to agree to the entry of all countries in Ambassador O'Sullivan's package to our current session except the two who have faced opposition. Second, to continue consultations to arrive at a consensus for the timing of entry of the two countries whose membership has been opposed.

This clearly is not a solution that we favour. But one that we may be able to support as it seems to be the only feasible and practical compromise solution the CD can reach now. The agreement to the immediate entry of the 21 is, of course, essential to this solution. I understand that, on this basis, we may not even need a special coordinator to follow up the issue as consultations may be carried out for the second element informally and without limitations that a formal decision and mandate will bring about.

(Mr. Nasseri, Islamic Republic of Iran)

If for any reason - though I believe there cannot be any justified reasons - the above solution is not possible, then the best way to move forward is to give an open mandate to a special coordinator that we should attempt to appoint as soon as possible to follow up the question. In this context, we may even be able to find mechanisms to assure countries in Ambassador O'Sullivan's package who have every reason to be a member that their place remains intact and will not be questioned in the new exercise.

This also gives us the important advantage of being able to address the situation of new applicants for membership. They, no doubt, deserve to have their applications reviewed promptly and fairly and at the same level as others. I share, by the way, the concern of these new applicants that if last year's package is adopted through the current two-stage proposal, then, despite the accompanying statement of Ambassador O'Sullivan that the door is not closed to others, for all practical purposes, and noting the difficulties we have already faced on the current situation, their entry to the CD as members will not be realized for years to come. It is quite justified to say that their motivation for entry is because they want to become members now. It is not clear as to whether in a few years, and by the time a new package could perhaps be arranged, the interest for those who are standing on the sidelines now would be maintained.

I believe these are the two viable options that we have and that my delegation stands to support. My delegation also remains receptive to any other possible suggestions that will ensure the immediate entry of those countries on whom there is a consensus and brings into reach the possibility for the membership within a reasonable, predictable time of other important countries who have applied to date.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me, and since he was kind enough to present me with a friendly challenge, I will be so bold as to take it up and reply: Man ham az shoma kheili tashakkur mikonam. I hope you will have understood that means I thank you.

I now give the floor to the representative of Mongolia, Ambassador Yumjav.

Mr. YUMJAV (Mongolia): At the outset allow me to associate myself with those who have already congratulated you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I am confident that your wide diplomatic experience and high competence will ensure the success of our work. A clear example of your efficient guidance of our deliberations is the establishment of the four ad hoc committees as well as the appointment of the chairmen of the appropriate committees and of the special coordinators. I wish to take this opportunity to extend my warm welcome to Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, the new Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, as well as to his newly appointed deputy, Mr. A. Bensmail. I would like also to join others in welcoming our new colleagues, namely the Ambassadors of Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Ethiopia, Italy and Venezuela.

(Mr. Yumjav, Mongolia)

It goes without saying that a CTBT will be the priority issue of this year's deliberations of the CD. In this connection, I would like to pay tribute to Ambassador Tanaka for his tremendous work, especially for elaborating the draft mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee. It is encouraging to note that this year the NTB Ad Hoc Committee has smoothly started its work under the able guidance of Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico, and it is prepared to start substantive discussions on such key issues as the scope, verification, organization, entry into force and compliance of the treaty. Since the beginning of the CD session many interesting views have been expressed both in the plenary and in the Ad Hoc Committee on a CTBT. The Group of 21 presented its preliminary views on a CTBT in working paper CD/1231. The position of my delegation on some key issues of a CTBT was reflected in the above-mentioned document of the Group of 21.

The early conclusion of a CTBT would undoubtedly contribute to the strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation and, in particular to the successful outcome of the NPT extension conference of 1995. Mongolia believes that, as a cornerstone of the present non-proliferation regime, the NPT should be strengthened and extended indefinitely at its forthcoming review conference.

We consider that another issue related to nuclear non-proliferation is a new item before us, namely the prohibition of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. My delegation is in favour of the initiation of negotiations in the CD on this important subject. We hope that the forthcoming consultations of the Special Coordinator will pave the way for the negotiations in the nearest future.

Situated in a strategically sensitive region, Mongolia proclaimed its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone as declared by President of Mongolia Punsalmaagiin Ochirbat in his address to the United Nations General Assembly on 25 September 1992. Consequently, we intend to seek credible security assurances from the nuclear-weapon States to respect the status of Mongolia as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. It is encouraging to note that at present four nuclear-weapon States have expressed their support for my country's non-nuclear status.

The Mongolian delegation considers the negative security assurances of non-nuclear States as a priority item in the context of strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. My delegation believes that the time is ripe for starting negotiations at the CD to elaborate a multilateral agreement in this regard. We hope that under the able guidance of Ambassador Hoffmann the Ad Hoc Committee this year will make a breakthrough on this subject.

Turning to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, my delegation notes with satisfaction the fact that there is wide agreement in the Ad Hoc Committee that the conclusion of an international agreement, or agreements, to prevent an arms race in outer space remained the fundamental task of the Committee and the concrete proposals on CBMs could form an integral part of the said agreements. Therefore, we support the view that there is a need to

(Mr. Yumjav, Mongolia)

expand and change the present mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee, thus giving the Committee a negotiating mandate. We expect that Ambassador José Pérez Novoa of Cuba, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, will work towards this direction.

With the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Armaments and the adoption by the United Nations Disarmament Conference of "substantial guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters", the cause of promoting transparency in military matters gained significant momentum. We are confident that a group of governmental experts to be convened this year will address further development of the Register. The Ad Hoc Committee established for the first time in the CD last year had substantive discussions on the complex issues related to transparency in disarmament. Many suggestions and working papers of practical significance were presented to the Ad Hoc Committee. I am convinced that under the guidance of Ambassador György Boytha of Hungary we will make further progress this year.

My delegation regrets that the expansion of membership of the CD is still pending. The solution to the question is essential in view of realizing the genuine aspirations of those who wish to contribute to the work of the CD. Therefore, my delegation looks forward to the earliest possible progress on enlarging the CD.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Mongolia for his statement and the kind words he addressed to the Chair. We have now come to the end of the list of speakers for today. Does any other representative wish to take the floor at this stage? I call on the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Ledogar.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Mr. President, I apologise for asking for the floor without prior inscription on your published list of speakers, but I am required to do so by the fact that the United States position on expansion of CD membership has been misstated and distorted by more than one speaker here this morning. The current stalemate on CD expansion is not a narrow political difference between one member State and one applicant State. It has to do with the status of one applicant vis-à-vis the entire international community. It was also stated that the situation on expansion remains the same today as it was on 3 September of last year. That is not so. Let me state very clearly for the record the United States position on CD expansion. We are prepared to agree, here today, before we rise for lunch if you wish, Mr. President, that all 23 States identified by Ambassador O'Sullivan in his report to the CD be immediately elevated from the current status as non-member participants to members, with one proviso that would be incorporated in the decision to do so, namely, that no member, no current member or new member who now or in the future should be subject to comprehensive enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter would be able to participate in Conference decisions. It is a very clear and simple proposal and I would be prepared to have it put to your gavel immediately if you wish.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): In the light of our discussion this morning, I am sure that you will make a practical proposal to us to continue discussion of the question of the expansion of the membership of the CD. I have asked for the floor in order to say that we heard with great satisfaction the statement made by the distinguished representative of Chile, Ambassador Hugo Cubillos. As the representative of the depositary Government of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America or Treaty of Tlatelolco, I wish to place on record our pleasure and satisfaction at the steps taken recently by the Government of Chile, steps that are designed to consolidate the regime of military denuclearization in the region.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): I too would like to apologise for speaking without being inscribed on the list of speakers. I do so because I think it would be helpful to give an immediate reaction to the important statement by the distinguished representative of Iran. In the view of my Government, two wrongs do not make a right. While we detest the behaviour of the Iraqi regime as much as anyone, we believe the United States is mistaken in opposing the admission of Iraq to the Conference. We have made clear the importance we attach to the admission of such countries as Iraq, particularly in the context of the CTBT negotiations. We believe, however, that Iran is wrong to oppose the admission of Israel, particularly at a time when the Israeli Government is participating fully and positively in the search for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The Iranian proposal to agree to the entry of all the countries in Ambassador O'Sullivan's package except for two is therefore unacceptable to my delegation. In the circumstances, we believe that the only answer is for you to appoint a special coordinator, as you intend, to continue the consultations on the whole question of expansion, but taking into account particularly the ingenious proposal of our distinguished Mexican colleague.

Mr. NASSERI (Islamic Republic of Iran): I seriously apologise for having to take the floor again, but since my dear colleague Ambassador Weston has referred, and reacted, to a proposal presumably made by me - and in my statement I had not made a formal proposal - I think I am now compelled to make a formal proposal so that it may be considered in whatever context we are going to follow up this discussion. I have noted that I already have one reaction from the United Kingdom.

My proposal is for the CD to decide - and there are four elements to this - to agree to the immediate entry of all countries within Ambassador O'Sullivan's package on which there is a consensus as new members; the second element - to search for ways to bring about agreement on the membership and timing of entry of those who are currently opposed; the third element - to review the other applications that have been made for CD membership to date; and the fourth element - to appoint a special coordinator to hold consultations with a view to enable the implementation of this decision. There are no priorities among the four elements, but of course my delegation has already stated on record that it prefers to see the first element adopted immediately. That is what I wish to propose today, and I will provide a written text of this proposal to the secretariat.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Are there any other representatives wishing to speak? I see that there are none.

I would now like to invite the Conference to consider the draft letter which I intend to send to the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency inviting him to address the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. This draft letter has been the subject of consultations among delegations and has been distributed among you. If you agree, I propose to send this letter to the Director-General of IAEA in accordance with rule 41 of our rules of procedure.

As usual, the secretariat has distributed the timetable of meetings for the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for next week. That timetable was drawn up in consultation with the chairmen of the ad hoc committees and can be amended as needed. If there are no objections, I shall take it that this timetable is adopted.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I would now like to suspend this meeting very briefly, and ask the group coordinators and the representatives of China, Mexico and the Islamic Republic of Iran to be so good as to join me in room C.108 for brief consultations.

The meeting was suspended at 12.35 p.m. and resumed at 1 p.m.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I hope that the members of the Conference will be kind enough to excuse this recess, which was somewhat longer than intended. These consultations with the group coordinators and China, as well as the representative of Mexico and a few delegations, focused on the question of the expansion of the membership of the Conference. They revealed that consultations should be pursued at a very early date and that at this stage there was no consensus for any decision. I wanted to tell you this before we depart and before adjourning this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference will take place on Thursday, 17 February 1994 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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ENGLISH ONLY

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND SEVENTIETH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 10 February 1994, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Gérard Errera (France)

Page 28, paragraph 4, line 6

For at present four nuclear-weapon States read to note that all five nuclear-weapon States

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